Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2002

Iraq and the Serious Consequences of Word Games: Language,
Violence and Responsibility in the Security Council
Craig Scott
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Source Publication:
German Law Journal. Volume 3, Number 11 (2002), p. 2-16.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Scott, Craig. "Iraq and the Serious Consequences of Word Games: Language, Violence and Responsibility
in the Security Council." German Law Journal 3.11 (2002): 2-16.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital
Commons.

Iraq and the Serious Consequences of Word Games: Language,
Violence and Responsibility in the Security Council
By Craig Scott
Suggested Citation: Craig Scott, Iraq and the Serious Consequences of Word
Games: Language, Violence and Responsibility in the Security Council, 3 German
Law Journal (2002), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=209
A. Introduction*
[1] For some months now and with special intensity in the past few weeks, a battle
over legal process – what may or may not the United States do militarily in Iraq
without new authorization from the UN Security Council, and at what stage and
under what conditions should a Council resolution give such authorization? – has
simultaneously become a battle over what words in a resolution will be sufficient to
count as implicit authorization. The current diplomatic discourse around a new Iraq
resolution is focussing on one or more "hidden triggers" in the draft text presented
by the US on October 21. (1)
[2] Having been manoeuvred into going to the UN by the political response to the
Cheney-Bush-Rumsfeld war drum beat over Iraq, the US continues to maintain
that, while a new resolution would be desirable as a signal of renewed 'international
community' resolve, such a resolution is not actually needed from a (US) legal
perspective. According to the US, prior Council resolutions on Iraq already permit
states to enforce the Council's disarmament regime. By Monday, October 28, the
United States was using this claim as a basis for castigating the Security Council for
dooming itself to irrelevance should it not agree to a text that the US can accept,
for the US would act on its own views anyway. (2)
[3] However, feeling the heat to a sufficient extent to feel UN cover would be highly
useful to facilitate that which the US and the UK are already willing – perhaps even
itching – to do, the US continues to present itself as acting in good faith by
engaging in a debate over what new action the Security Council should take. It is
here that the US preference for one resolution and France's preference for two
meet the world of word politics.
[4] Initially, France led resistance in the Security Council to the United States'
insistence on a single Council resolution. (3) The US sought a resolution that would
specify the standards with which Iraq must comply with respect to its 'weapons of
mass destruction' (WMD) and clearly permit (whether expressly or implicitly) states

to then respond to non-compliance with force, extending to invasion, without the
need for any further Council action. In France's view, two stages are needed: a new
resolution that sets out the standards and then a second resolution authorizing
force should Iraq fail to comply with the first (and should Council members then
deem force to be justified). (4)
[5] However, that was then and this may be now. By the weekend of October 2527, the world of power politics and the world of language have come together in
such a way that a mutual saving of face (who has given in to whom?) will still result
in a final text that leaves space for US interpretive unilateralism. It will surprise no
one familiar with international politics that it is possible that France is playing a
double game, according to which it can claim to have stood up to the US
unilateralist-militarist impulse while knowingly leaving intact language in a Council
resolution that has in the past been used by the US to justify using force against
Iraq – albeit in the form of one-off targeted attacks in contrast to the current
invasion scenario.
[6] This article seeks to lay bare what is at stake with respect to Security Council
Resolution textual semantics, in light of the interplay over the past decade between
Council resolutions, a hybrid warning-threat discourse of "serious consequences"
and aerial bombardments by the US (along with the UK, and, on at least one
occasion, France itself) of Iraq in 1993, 1997 and 1998. After showing what the
serious consequences of "serious consequences" could be, I end by arguing that,
since Council texts are not all-governing but instead are located in a web of
associated interpretive signals, it is crucial for key states to delegitimize US claims
to UN endorsement of its war agenda by going on record with their interpretations
of what the resolution does not permit.
B. The First Hidden Trigger: "Material Breach"
[7] The US draft that began circulating in the week of October 20 refers to Iraq
being a persistent delinquent with respect to previous Security Council resolutions
since the end of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. It does this by using a term of art –
"material breach" – drawn from the law of treaties. Pour memoire, according to the
law of treaties, a material breach of a treaty by a party to that treaty permits other
parties to consider the treaty as having been repudiated – whether suspended or
terminated. (5) In using the language of "material breach", US government lawyers
and a number of legal academics have presented Council resolutions setting out
standards and finding non-compliance with those standards by Iraq as creating a
relationship between the UN Security Council and Iraq that is akin to a relationship
between parties to an international agreement (treaty). I set out below the
trajectory of the legal argument that the US and the UK clearly intend to be

available to them should a new Council resolution on Iraq contain the "material
breach" language.
[8] In 1990, Security Council Resolution 678 authorized states cooperating with
Kuwait to use "all necessary means" to force Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and
also to "restore international peace and security in the area." (6) After Operation
Desert Storm succeeded in ousting Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 687. (7) It imposed a cease-fire on all combatants and also
established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was the
United Nations' most ambitious and sophisticated monitoring regime to date.
UNSCOM was charged with the mandate of discerning Iraq's continuing weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) programs and verifying that its weaponry and weaponmaking capacity had been destroyed by Iraq. A comprehensive sanctions regime
was also associated with the weapons-inspection regime. The removal of sanctions
was the intended prize for Iraq once it had complied with all requirements to
eliminate its WMD capacity. In relatively short order, Iraq resisted the UNSCOM
inspections regime.
[9] Iraq's tactics included engaging in periodic games of brinkmanship with the
United States and the United Kingdom whenever these states made clear that they
were willing to employ military force as a response to Iraq's non-compliance with
Resolution 687. Starting with the United States, some states began to advance or
accept an interpretive theory that contended that, if the inspection requirements of
Resolution 687 were "materially breached," then the cease-fire mandated by
Resolution 687 could reciprocally be considered by states that had been cooperating
with Kuwait as having been suspended. The consequence of this suspension of the
requirement to respect the cease-fire would be, according to this theory, that the
original Resolution 678 would become applicable again, including, in particular, the
authorization to use "all necessary means ... to restore international peace and
security in the area."
[10] There are significant problems with the plausibility of this interpretive theory of
the relationship between Resolutions 687 and 678, not least being the chronological
problems of Resolution 678 having envisioned a restoration of peace and security.
Such a mandate, quite clearly, did not contemplate the revision of the status quo
ante through a comprehensive disarmament program aimed at Iraq. However, in
the present context, it would be a mistake to focus on the plausibility of the US
theory of material breach as if it were some kind of ‘pure' legal question to be
decided in the realm of sound analytical reasoning.
[11] Legal theories and associated specific arguments ultimately achieve validation
by complex processes of acceptance by and from within relevant communities of

interpretation. In domestic legal systems, the judiciary is the key (although far
from only) community whose adherence needs to be secured, or at least predicted,
but, in international peace and security law, we do not have this luxury. Instead, a
more diffuse and power-compromised community of judgement is the key
audience. In matters of military violence, the views of and stances taken by all
states matter, but, at any given moment, the five permanent members of the
Security Council and rotating group of ten other states have the power to decide
whether to endorse or not endorse a given theory. In an ideal legal world, this
decision would be produced through a process of unforced persuasion but in the
real normative world of the Security Council, a combination of coercive and porkbarrelling tactics are often employed to secure ‘acceptance' of powerful states'
preferences.
[12] Thus it is that context matters. The US "material breach" theory is known
intimately by all other Security Council actors, not to mention all observing states
not themselves members of the Council. Leaving in the "material breach" language
will transform the US arguments from one that was bordering on being a bad-faith
rationalization of the will to power to being one that can be presented in some good
faith as ‘law' acquiesced by other law-makers. Council members need only have
read the Saturday New York Times, in case they were on a break during the
relevant corridor discussions at the UN on Friday, October 25. "American diplomats
said this language was central because it could allow them to argue, if Iraq balked
at the arms inspections, that Baghdad's new violations compounded its past ones
and nullified the cease-fire agreements that ended the Persian Gulf war in 1991.
This would open the legal way for military action." (8)
[13] Counting against my double-game fears about France's strategy is the fact
that France appears to be continuing to resist the US. As of the weekend of October
26, both France and Russia were circulating their own informal texts as working
documents, although they have both stopped short of tabling their texts as
competing draft resolutions. The French draft drops all references to "material
breach." An unnamed French diplomat presents France's concerns in the New York
Times of Saturday, October 26, in the following way: "This is war and peace. You
cannot adopt a text with ambiguities." (9)
[14] The problem is that ambiguities are exactly what the French now seem to be
willing to countenance. While focussing attention on the material-breach ‘hidden
trigger', France is leaving in place – and according to news reports, perhaps even
beefing up – language from the US draft that is conducive to US arguments of
implicit authorization: the language of "serious consequences." That France knows
that its own version still contains US-friendly ambiguities is made completely clear
when the French text is contrasted to the Russian working document. Julia Preston,

the reporter for the New York Times following the evolving discourse the most
closely, sees clearly the difference: "The Russian proposal did little to strengthen
the weapons inspection issue, and included no mention of ‘material breach' or
‘serious consequences' – that is, no threat of military action."
[15] Meanwhile, at the end of the weekend, Mexico, one of the ten rotating
members of the Security Council, threw a monkey wrench into the (US) works by
siding with the French informal resolution, and, Mexico makes clear, with the twostage approach that it understands France to still be adhering to. (11) Mexico
presents itself as a non-syncophantic friend of the US, a friend attempting to
preserve both a multilateral consensus and a credible international signal of future
force against Iraq: "‘What we want is a resolution that is approved by all 15 – or 14
– members of the Security Council,' said [Mexican Foreign Minister] Casteñeda. ‘We
think that's more important for the United States' cause.'" (12)
[16] Thus it is that the semantic stakes may well come down to whether or not –
and, if so, how – the Council agrees to include "serious consequences" language in
whatever resolution is adopted.
C. The Second Hidden Trigger: "Serious Consequences"
[17] In order to drive home why Russia's opposition to "serious consequences"
language is grounded in a well-justified fear of what use the US and UK will make of
the language without recourse to any further resolution, I will now proceed to
excavate for the reader a less-straightforward interpretive evolution within Security
Council practice. My narrative looks at the effect of warnings from the Security
Council about the future "serious" or "severest" consequences of continuing noncompliance with Council resolutions. Although the immediate purpose of this
upcoming discussion is more explanatory than judgmental, the purpose is indeed to
get us to the crucial normative issue at stake in the current bargaining over the text
of a Council resolution: should the international legal community accept warnings of
unspecified consequences from unspecified quarters as being sufficient to authorize
states to act militarily in order to force compliance, without having first received
any further instructions from the Council?
[18] Two preliminary, but crucial, points must be made in order to prepare the
reader for the nuanced nature of the normative signalling games in which states
engage in the context of negotiating the space between the Charter's multilateral
monopoly over the use of force (other than in justifiable self-defence) and the
reality of unilateral or oligopolistic judgments being made by states wishing, or
simply being willing, to use force to secure (what are presented as) the ends of the
international community as a whole.

[19] First of all, central to the narrative will be the linguistic acts of two actors —
the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General — who are not
expressly accorded an authoritative role with respect to interpreting the meaning of
Security Council resolutions, let alone a central one. A key part of the signalling
game at stake in the Iraq context has been the relationship between their
statements and the formally binding collective acts of the Security Council in the
form of resolutions.
[20] Second, I have been using the term "warning" to describe the statements
emanating from the Security Council, and I will continue to use this term. However,
I do so advisedly, because a significant part of the ambiguity surrounding the
import of these statements is precisely whether or not they are best characterized
as warnings or, instead, as threats. The difference hinges on the relationship
between the actor(s) uttering the threat or warning and the actor(s) that are meant
to be understood as being prepared to act on that threat or warning should the
triggering conditions (indicated in the threat or warning) be met. The actor who
utters a threat will be the actor that will make good on the threat, whereas the
actor acting on a warning will be different from the actor issuing the warning.
[21] If it is tolerably clear that the members of the Security Council at any given
time intend the expressions "serious consequences" or "severest consequences" to
refer to, or at least to include, military measures (in a manner not dissimilar to how
"all necessary means," as used in Resolution 678, is now understood as a term of
art for an express authorization to use force), it is by no means clear in which of at
least three possible ways the Security Council wishes to be understood. The options
are: (1) as a threat that the Security Council, seized of the matter, will return to it
and subsequently expressly authorize military measures; (2) as a warning that
there are some states that will take matters into their own hands and adopt the
military option (leaving this as a factual statement with no normative stance being
taken towards this eventuality one way or the other); or (3) as a hybrid in which
threat and warning join hands in such a way that the signal is that some states will
adopt this option and that, if this happens, the Council will treat this conduct as
lawful. It is the third validating signal that transmits a warning simultaneously as a
threat — and, put differently, as an implicit authorization by the Council for states
to act as its agent. I now turn to how it is that the combined role — even tag-team
performance — of the Security Council President and the Secretary-General may
have helped pave the way in the present Iraq crisis for a threat of future action by
the Security Council (the first signal) and a warning of future action by unspecified
states (the second signal) to be converted into this third hybrid signal.

[22] In early 1998, Secretary-General Kofi Annan went, on his own initiative, to
Baghdad in order to seek concessions from Iraq that would have the effect of
avoiding military strikes that were being threatened by the United States in
particular. After Annan's return to New York in March 1998 with the United NationsIraq Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), many in the United States' foreign
policy apparatus were incensed at his intervention, which had made it politically
impossible at that time for the United States to go ahead with its military strikes —
strikes that were viewed as being necessary in light of a persistent pattern of bad
faith non-compliance by Iraq with the UNSCOM regime. (13) To soften the sting,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1154, in which it was stated that the
"severest consequences" would result should Iraq not live up to the MOU that it had
just entered into with Secretary-General Annan. (14) The employment of this
phrase seemed designed to tap into a discursive precedent that seems to have
become instantiated as a linguistic convention in prior Security Council practice visà-vis Iraq, albeit not within, but rather parallel to, Security Council resolutions — in
the form of statements of the President of the Council. Note that, in this regard, the
Presidency of the Security Council rotates amongst the different member states of
the Council, with the President's statements being issued, by commonly accepted
practice, only where the President of the Security Council, at the time, is confident
that the statement in question reflects the consensus of the Security Council
members.
[23] On at least two occasions prior to 1998, in 1993 and then again in 1997, the
Security Council president used similar, while not identical, language when Iraq was
warned of "serious consequences" should it continue to fail to comply with Security
Council demands for cooperation with UNSCOM. (15) Following the 1993 warning
(indeed, only two days later), the United Kingdom, the United States, and France
went on to bomb Iraqi targets in southern Iraq. (16) Whether or not any firm
consensus had evolved by 1998 amongst the permanent members of the Security
Council with respect to at least a de facto acquiescence in recourse to military
action following a presidential warning of "serious consequences," the
aforementioned 1998 warning did seem to represent a qualitative shift in the
Council's linguistic signalling practice, since it differed in two significant respects
from those of 1993 and 1997 — in both form and content. In terms of form, the
1998 warning was inserted within Security Council Resolution 1154 itself, rather
than being articulated at one step removed through the formally non-binding
vehicle of presidential notes or statements. As for the content of the warning, the
expression "severest consequences" is obviously an order of magnitude beyond
"serious consequences." Combining form and substance, an external observer
would be forgiven for interpreting there to have been a deeper level of collective
resolve in 1998: if warnings of "serious consequences" outside the body of a
Security Council resolution could be understood (that is, in the 1993 and 1997

precedents) as an implicit signal by the Security Council that force may be used,
then "severest" consequences warned — or threatened — within a resolution must
a fortiori be an even clearer signal: an implicit authorization.
[24] However, in 1998, matters seem to have changed. During the debate over the
terms of Resolution 1154, China stated emphatically that the warning of "severest
consequences" in that resolution would, in China's words, not lead to "automatic
authorization of the use of force against Iraq." (17) On the surface of things, it
would seem that China knew full well what normative stakes were involved in
Resolution 1154's terminology in light of the signalling games of 1993 and 1997, in
which it, China, had participated. At this point, the role of soloist in the Security
Council concerto, which had previously been that of the President, was now taken
up by Secretary-General Annan himself. His solo performance in the interpretive
tug-of-war over what Resolution 1154 was permitting involved an ABC television
news appearance. Should Iraq not comply with the MOU he had brokered in early
1998, Annan was asked, would the use of military force require a new Security
Council resolution or would Resolution 1154's language be sufficient to allow willing
states to take military measures against Iraq? In what were obviously very closely
constructed sentences, Annan noted that the United States had consulted broadly
throughout the crisis, and this action had resulted in Annan going to Baghdad to
seek the MOU. Then, he added the following: "The Russians, the French and
Chinese ... resisted [the] idea of automaticity. And therefore, if the United States
had to strike, I think some sort of consultations with the other members would be
required." (18) Some eight months later, in November 1998, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France eventually did decide to use military force on the basis
that Iraq had continued to fail to comply with both Resolution 687 and the March
1998 MOU.
[25] For the purposes of the present discussion, the key is to know the extent to
which the UK and US engaged in consultations with other Security Council members
before unleashing their bombing campaign in November 1998. All things
considered, we are probably safe to assume they did. Recall China's own carefully
chosen words in the debate over the language of Resolution 1154 — China had
objected to an interpretation of the words "severest consequences," which would
have permitted an automatic recourse to force — and Secretary-General Annan had
glossed over that objection by seemingly suggesting that "consultations" would
satisfy China's concerns with automaticity. To the extent that the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France did consult prior to their strike in November 1998, did
they do so in the belief that at some level China had sent a normative signal that it
understood that force could result without a subsequent, fresh resolution by virtue
of its own careful choice of words during the debates over Resolution 1154 and its
subsequent lack of objection — or, at least, objection on the public record — to the

Secretary-General's interpretive spin broadcast on US television, which was widely
reported thereafter?
[26] What, precisely, is the relevance of the foregoing narrative? First of all, as I
hope has emerged with some clarity from the discussion itself, a Security Counciloriented practice of engaging in layered signalling games blurs with the creation of
real-world, shared understandings on how to go about interpreting Security Council
resolutions in which the implicit authorization of the use of force (for example, in
Resolution 1154) is at stake. Second, as a corollary to the first point, the handling
of Iraq suggests how the frames of reference within which Security Council
resolutions are drafted are constantly evolving. Another way of putting this point is
to say that baseline understandings evolve in such a way that formulations that are
initially viewed as being opaque by external viewers, and as being coded by internal
participants, come to take on a clarity. For example, the search for implicit
authorization of the use of force can evolve from a broad contextual inquiry into a
simple semantic exercise of identifying a key phrase that has been invested with
particular meaning at some point in time. So, just as "all necessary means" (recall
Resolution 678) is now an accepted code for Security Council authorization of
military force and, as such, is now thought of as virtually an express authorization
within the language community in question despite no specific mention of anything
to do with force or military means, the practice of warning of "serious
consequences" is perhaps on the verge of becoming understood by the permanent
members of the Security Council to be a warning — or, in line with the earlier
discussion, a hybrid warning-threat — that future military action may occur without
a subsequent Security Council resolution expressly authorizing this action.
Measured against the standard conventions of drafting legal instruments, the
lawyer concludes that, when the Security Council goes on to use the same language
again, this use is intentional and interpreters are meant to understand the words in
the new case as they have come to be understood in light of previous practice.
[27] In light of the just-described practice surrounding past dealings with Iraq, it is
starkly apparent that Russia is justified in worrying that the US and UK can move
forward by invoking the "serious consequences" language as code for some kind of
Council acquiescence, separate from and in addition to the "material breach"
rationale. By taking care to go through some kind of P-5 or broader Security
Council ‘consultation' process before striking – strike that: invading – they will build
on precedent while even more clearly cementing that precedent.
D. Language, Violence and Responsibility: Interpretively Outflanking the US and
UK?

[28] It has not been my purpose to argue for or against the UN Security Council
authorizing military action against Iraq – although, given the opportunity, I would
make the argument that, in the focus on whether or not the US should be allowed
to act unilaterally, too many are failing to fully engage with the morality and
wisdom of even a multilateral military campaign in Iraq that is expressly authorized
by the Security Council. In any case, my purpose has been to attempt to shine a
spotlight on how the line between Council authorization and individual state
aggression has been blurred by semantic politics and diplomatic signalling games.
[29] In this concluding section, my concern is to insist on states taking
responsibility for their involvement in structuring a textual environment in which
the US is given licence to rationalize its power-based and particular nationalinterest calculations in the form of legal arguments. If France (now supported by
Mexico) intends to allow the US to engage in interpretive unilateralism – i.e.
allowing the US to say that Council resolutions, especially a new resolution, can be
interpreted to contain authorization for a single state to enforce those resolutions
based on that state's own assessments – then France has to be called on this and
pressured to link the language it employs with its responsibility for violence that
may eventuate. (19)
[30] As matters have evolved, France, like Mexico, is coming closer to acting in
concert with the US than acting in opposition to it. Its reasons may be craven (e.g.
favourable consideration for French oil companies), geopolitically Machiavellian
(engaging in enough resistance to argue – whether or not believed – in the Arab
world that they did what they could to resist the US), pragmatic (lessening the
chances France will become a central target of terrorism), or all combined. Or, a
core reason might very well be a tactical one: France may see themselves as
playing, with the US and other partners, a kind of multi-level bargaining game in
which France considers that, for Iraq to substantially comply with a renewed
inspections regime, Iraq must actually be made to believe that the US will use force
if there is clear non-compliance and that there will be some level of an unholy
alliance with other powerful states in the form of a coded silence that can be
presented as, at minimum, moral or political tacit approval and, maximally, as legal
acquiescence.
[31] There is some evidence that the tactical consideration is active in guiding
France's conduct and that France is willingly seeking to strengthen the hybrid
warning-threat signal being sent to Iraq. As reported in the New York Times: "In its
proposal today, France made a concession to the United States by strengthening its
[France's] own language about ‘serious consequences', and placing it at the end [of
the draft resolution], a location normally reserved in the Council's resolutions for
threats to be acted upon." (20) If this is France's game, this too has to be brought

into the light of day so that all concerned actors understand fully that France is
knowingly and deliberately participating in a brinkmanship policy. The danger of
such a policy is obvious: such a policy puts credibility on the line, with the result
that states engaging in threat or warning-threat strategies face the choice of having
their bluff called or unleashing a war should Iraq substantially fail to comply. Too
many have forgotten how, ultimately, the decision of NATO to go to war over
Kosovo was related as much to NATO's credibility – following employment of a
threat strategy against Yugoslavia's Milosevic –as to a humanitarian motive.
[32] Based on the foregoing analysis, we will be able to call various actors to
account for their conduct after the fact – including for their silence in the face of
knowledge of the import of the textual games they are playing or witnessing.
However, the goal of this article is to contribute to transparency before the final
Iraq-resolution text is settled upon – or in the immediate aftermath of a vote when
interpretive explanations can still play a role in structuring the meaning that can be
plausibly attributed to the text. By shining a spotlight on the serious consequences
of "serious consequences", the hope is that key states will be pushed into a mode
of public justification that will lead to US and UK interpretive unilateralism being
interpretively outflanked.
[33] There are three groups of states that must be forced to take responsibility.
[34] If France and Mexico do not want to be understood as having not only agreed
to a hidden trigger but also having helped turn it into a hairtrigger, they must
either join Russia in opposing the "serious consequences" language or they must
insist that it stays in on condition that express language links the determination of
those consequences to a subsequent Security Council process and (as the case may
be) second-stage resolution. (21) At the very least, France in particular must be
pressured to state publicly that it does not view the resolution as allowing force
without a further Council resolution. Even if only one permanent member – e.g.
France – goes on record as explaining its vote in this way, then it becomes
correspondingly disingenuous for the US or UK to say they have received
authorization. Were both France and Russia to say that "serious consequences"
does refer to military force but is not a coded authorization for unilaterally
determined exercise of such force, any interpretive unilateralism on the part of the
US or UK would more clearly stand to be condemned as the aggression it would be.
Despite the likelihood of a Chinese abstention, it may be that China will join France
and Russia in such an interpretive statement.
[35] If other Council members – for example, Singapore and Ireland, along with
Mexico – do not want to endorse interpretive unilateralism, they must cast their
votes accordingly in full knowledge that they can be accused of having given the US

and UK tacit approval if they vote for a resolution with either a "material breach" or
"serious consequences" clause, without there being safeguard language to
counteract those clauses. Such safeguard language could include the express
provision for a second-stage Council process, which itself could take the form of a
revised version of the standard final clause of Council resolutions that says that the
Council shall "remain seized" of the matter. As things stand, the United States'
publicly articulated theory of material breach and its more subterranean theory of
serious consequences do not see this standard final clause as barring individualstate enforcement action but rather as some kind of pro forma statement of
ongoing Council attention to the matter – attention that is concurrent to action
based on existing resolutions but not preclusive of it. Council members have to
begin to make clear that this standard clause is not empty of content, but signals
that the Council is the body to decide on what serious consequences shall be absent
any clear language that it has already delegated that authority.
[36] Finally, there are states that are not members of the Council – states such as
Canada – whose views also matter. If they are truly concerned, they have the
means to interpretively surround the Security Council text by providing their own
view of the contents and limits of the text. The authoritative interpretation
(including interpretive evolution) of the UN Charter – including those legal acts
authorized by the Charter – is ultimately in the hands of all member states of the
UN and not simply a fluctuating group of 15 states with the P-5 at its controlling
core.

* Associate Professor and Associate Dean (Research and Graduate Studies),
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. The author wishes to thank
Frédéric Mégret for his comments on the first draft of this article. The article was
originally written on October 26, 2002, and has been updated to take into account
developments up to and including Monday, October 28, 2002. Portions of this article
will appear, in modified form, in a forthcoming piece on humanitarian intervention:
C Scott, "Interpreting Intervention", (2001) 39 Canadian Yearbook of International
Law 333-369.
(1) Draft of a U.S.-British Resolution on Iraq and Inspectors, New York Times, 23
October 2002, A23. Note especially U.S.-U.K. draft clause 2 ("DECIDES that false
statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this
resolution or failure at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the
implementation of, this resolution shall constitute further material breach of Iraq's
obligations.") and draft clause 3 ("RECALLS that the Council has repeatedly warned
Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of

its obligations.") . See also Julia Preston, "'Big 5' at the United Nations Still
Jockeying Over Iraq Text," New York Times, 23 October 2002, A23.
(2) David E. Sanger, "Iraq Makes U.N. Seem ‘Foolish', Bush Asserts," New York
Times, 29 October 2002, A13: "[t]he White House declared that time had run out at
the United Nations, and that the United States would demand a vote on an Iraq
resolution, whether it wins the wording it wants or not. With each [US Congress]
campaign stop, Mr. Bush reiterated – sometimes nearly shouting – that the United
States was willing to disarm Mr. Hussein without the explicit authorization of the
United Nations. ‘If the United Nations doesn't have the courage to disarm, for the
sake of peace, for the sake of freedom, the United States will lead a coalition to
disarm Iraq,' Mr Bush said…"
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